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Speakers often wish to refer to different numbers of entities. 
To do this, they can use quantifiers such as every or a. Using 
quantifiers appears to be straightforward, yet it can lead to 
ambiguity when more than one quantifier is used. For exam-
ple, the apparently simple sentence Every kid climbed a tree is 
not ambiguous with respect to the relationship between the 
verb and its arguments; it is clear that every kid is the subject 
of climbed and that a tree is the object of climbed. But the 
sentence is ambiguous in a different way. It may be that there 
is one tree, which every kid climbed; alternatively, every kid 
may have climbed a different tree. Linguists and philosophers 
have long assumed that the apparently simple form of sen-
tences such as these hides ambiguity, and they have attempted 
to bring such ambiguity into the open using appropriate repre-
sentations. But do people construct such representations when 
processing language, and, if so, what is the nature of these 
representations?
Interest in these representations goes back to Russell 
(1919), who used them to provide a precise account of when 
sentences were true or false. The analysis of such sentences 
has been central to the branch of linguistics known as formal 
semantics (which is concerned with the meaning of complex 
expressions and not merely individual words), most notably 
Montague Grammar (Dowty, Wall, & Peters, 1981). More 
recently, linguists have integrated formal semantics with 
syntactic theory (e.g., May, 1985). All these approaches use a 
disambiguated logical form (LF) to describe sentences. In our 
example (ignoring tense), the interpretation in which every kid 
climbed a potentially different tree can be represented as (1a), 
and the interpretation in which there is one tree that every kid 
climbed can be represented as (1b):
∀x [Kid (x) → ∃y [Tree (y) ∧ Climb (x, y)]]      (1a)
∃y [Tree (y) ∧ ∀x [Kid (x) → Climb (x, y)]]      (1b)
The meaning of (1a) is “For every x, if x is a kid then there is 
some y such that y is a tree, and x climbed y.” The universal 
quantifier ∀ takes scope over the expression within both sets 
of square brackets, and we refer to (1a) as the universal-wide 
interpretation. The meaning of (1b) is “For some y, y is a tree 
and for every x, if x is a kid then x climbed y.” The existential 
quantifier ∃ takes scope over the expression within both sets of 
square brackets, and we refer to (1b) as the existential-wide 
interpretation. In (1a), the universal quantifier takes wide 
scope; in (1b), the existential quantifier takes wide scope.
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Abstract
How do people interpret ambiguous sentences containing more than one quantifier, such as Every kid climbed a tree? We report 
four sentence-picture matching experiments that used priming to investigate whether comprehenders construct logical-form 
representations during processing. Experiment 1 investigated priming in active-voice sentences containing transitive verbs and 
found priming effects of quantifier-scope relations. Experiment 2 demonstrated priming effects when prime sentences were in 
the passive voice (e.g., A tree was climbed by every kid) and target sentences were in the active voice. Experiment 3 used prime 
sentences containing existentially quantified agents and universally quantified patients (e.g., A kid climbed every tree) and found 
no priming effects. Experiment 4 showed no priming effects when prime sentences contained plural nouns but no quantifiers 
(e.g., Kids like to climb trees), thus calling into question a visual-priming account of our priming effects. Our findings suggest that 
people construct logical-form representations, and they do so after constructing meaning-based representations involving 
quantifiers and thematic-role information.
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Most linguists regard LF as a separate level of representa-
tion that sits between syntactic representation (e.g., constitu-
ent structures) and semantic interpretation (meaning). May 
(1985), for example, argued that LF involves so-called quanti-
fier raising (see also Aoun & Li, 1993). In our example, a tree 
moves from after climbed to one of two “landing sites”: after 
every kid in the universal-wide interpretation (1a) and before 
every kid in the existential-wide interpretation (1b). In this 
way, the quantifiers (e.g., ∀x) achieve scope over their quanti-
fied elements (e.g., Kid (x)), just as one constituent can take 
scope over another constituent (i.e., c-command it) in a 
constituent-structure tree (Chomsky, 1981).
Psychologists have extensively investigated the mental rep-
resentation and processing of syntactic information, both in 
comprehension (e.g., Frazier, 1987) and in production (e.g., 
Bock, 1986). But there has been little attempt to determine 
whether people construct LF representations and, if people do, 
what characteristics these representations have. The few stud-
ies concerned with the processing of quantifier-scope phe-
nomena have focused on why people prefer particular 
interpretations of ambiguous sentences (Filik, Paterson, & 
Liversedge, 2004; Kurtzman & MacDonald, 1993; Paterson, 
Filik, & Liversedge, 2008). For example, Kurtzman and 
MacDonald asked people to judge the acceptability of passages 
containing ambiguous sentences, and they found a preference 
for the universal-wide interpretation of active-voice sentences 
(e.g., 1a for Every kid climbed a tree), but no preference for 
either interpretation of passive-voice sentences. These studies 
show that semantic interpretation is affected by quantifiers, 
but do not show whether people compute LF representations 
independently of semantic interpretation, or whether such rep-
resentations intervene between syntactic and semantic repre-
sentations, as would be compatible with May’s (1985) theory.
We therefore investigated whether it is possible to prime 
the abstract structure of LF representations during comprehen-
sion. Structural priming studies suggest that people compute 
linguistic representations during production (Bock, 1986) and 
comprehension (Branigan, Pickering, & McLean, 2005; Carey, 
Mehler, & Bever, 1970). Although most of these studies pro-
vide evidence for representations associated with syntax, other 
studies have shown priming of semantic representations in 
production (Bock, Loebell, & Morey, 1992; Chang, Bock, & 
Goldberg, 2003) and comprehension (Raffray, Pickering, & 
Branigan, 2007). If people compute an LF representation, 
it is therefore likely that it will be susceptible to priming (see 
Pickering & Ferreira, 2008).
We conducted four experiments using sentence-picture 
matching (Branigan et al., 2005; Raffray et al., 2007). In 
Experiment 1, the prime sentences were in the active voice and 
were similar to the target sentences (e.g., Every kid climbed a 
tree); hence, primes and targets had the same ambiguity. We 
predicted that participants would interpret target sentences in 
the same way that they interpreted prime sentences. In Experi-
ment 2, the prime sentences were in the passive voice (e.g., A 
tree was climbed by every kid); these sentences were also 
ambiguous regarding the two interpretations. Experiment 3 
used active-voice prime sentences in which the order of the 
quantifiers was the reverse of their order in Experiment 1 (e.g., 
A kid climbed every tree); these sentences also had two inter-
pretations. In Experiment 4, prime sentences were not ambig-
uous (e.g., Kids like to climb trees).
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Thirty-two native English-speaking students 
from the University of Edinburgh were paid to participate.
Stimuli and procedure. We constructed 24 sets of items (see 
Prime and Target Sentences Used in the Experiments in the 
Supplemental Material available online), each of which con-
sisted of a prime sentence and a target sentence, two pairs of 
prime pictures, and a pair of target pictures. Prime and target 
sentences were of the form Every noun verbed a noun, with 
the two sentences using the same verb but different nouns (as 
verb repetition tends to enhance structural priming effects; see 
Pickering & Ferreira, 2008). In the universal-wide condition, a 
prime sentence such as Every kid climbed a tree was associated 
with the pictures at the top left of Figure 1a. In the existential-
wide condition, the same sentence was associated with the pic-
tures at the top right of Figure 1a. In both cases, the matching 
picture represented the appropriate interpretation of the prime 
sentence, and the nonmatching picture involved either a differ-
ent agent (for half the items) or a different patient (for the 
other half; an example of the latter is shown in Fig. 1a). A tar-
get sentence such as Every hiker climbed a hill was presented 
along with two pictures (such as those in Fig. 1b); these pic-
tures corresponded to the universal-wide and existential-wide 
interpretations of the sentence.
The items involved 12 verbs. All agent nouns were animate 
(e.g., kid, hiker); half of the object nouns were animate (e.g., 
surfer, professor), and half were inanimate (e.g., ship, sculp-
ture). The animacy of patient nouns was kept constant between 
prime and target sentences, although the nouns themselves 
varied. The representation of agent and patient entities in all 
the matching and nonmatching pictures was as follows: Eight 
items were illustrated by three agent entities and either one or 
three patient entities (depending on interpretation), eight items 
were illustrated by four agent entities and either one or four 
patient entities, and eight items were illustrated by five agent 
entities and either one or five patient entities. The order of the 
pictures was counterbalanced across items and across prime- 
and target-sentence pairs.
In addition, we constructed 72 unambiguous filler sen-
tences and corresponding pairs of matching and nonmatching 
pictures. Forty-eight filler sentences used transitive verbs, and 
24 filler sentences used intransitive verbs. Again, the agent 
nouns were animate, and the patient nouns were equally split 
between animate and inanimate. The nonmatching picture had 
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a different agent than did the matching picture for half of the 
filler sentences, and it had a different patient noun for the other 
half.
We constructed two lists containing all 24 items and all 72 
fillers. Each list had 12 items per condition and one version of 
each item. Each list was randomized for each participant with 
the constraint that two, three, or four fillers intervened between 
items. Prime sentences and prime pictures immediately pre-
ceded target sentences and target pictures.
The stimuli were presented on a computer screen using 
E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, 
PA). Participants read a sentence and then used a button box to 
select the picture that best matched the sentence. Participants 
read a prime sentence and then selected between a picture that 
matched one interpretation of the prime sentence and a picture 
that did not match any interpretation of that sentence. They 
then read an ambiguous target sentence (e.g., Every hiker 
climbed a hill) and selected between a picture that matched the 
Experiment 1: Every kid climbed a tree
Experiment 2: A tree was climbed by every kid
Experiment 4: Kids like to climb trees
Every hiker climbed a hill
Prime Sentences and Pictures
Universal-Wide Condition Existential-Wide Condition
Universal-Wide Condition Existential-Wide Condition
Universal-Wide Response Existential-Wide Response
Experiment 3: A kid climbed every tree
Target Sentence and Pictures
a
b
Fig. 1. Sample sentences and corresponding pictures in the two conditions of each experiment. Participants were 
presented with a prime sentence and instructed to select the picture that matched their interpretation of the 
sentence (a). To observe the effects of priming, we then presented participants with a target sentence and gave them 
the same instruction (b). Sentence-picture matching was completed for a universal-wide condition and an existential-
wide condition.
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universal-wide interpretation of that sentence and a picture 
that matched the existential-wide interpretation of that sen-
tence. Seven practice trials preceded the experiment. The ses-
sion lasted about 15 min.
Coding and analysis. One item was eliminated from this 
experiment (and also from Experiments 2–4) because of a pro-
gramming error. We also eliminated trials on which a partici-
pant selected the incorrect prime picture. The remaining 
responses were coded according to whether the corresponding 
target selected was a universal-wide or an existential-wide 
picture.
We analyzed our data by modeling response-type likeli-
hood using logit mixed-effect models (Jaeger, 2008). We 
started all analyses with a null model that included our bino-
mial dependent variable and participants and items as random 
factors; we added the predictor variable or variables to this 
model (incrementally, if there was more than one predictor) to 
see whether the model was improved. Model fit was assessed 
using chi-square tests on the log-likelihood values to compare 
different models. All analyses were carried out in the R pro-
gramming language and environment (R Development Core 
Team, 2008) using the lme4 software package (Bates, 
Maechler, & Dai, 2008).
Results and discussion
Table 1 summarizes participants’ selections, and Table 2 pres-
ents the results of the statistical analyses. Participants selected 
universal-wide target pictures significantly more often after 
selecting universal-wide prime pictures than after selecting 
existential-wide prime pictures (8%). Thus, participants 
appeared to construct an abstract representation incorporating 
quantifier-scope information, and this representation persever-
ated in a way that affected participants’ choice of target 
responses. The effect of priming between sentences with dif-
ferent interpretations suggests that participants computed anw 
LF representation that was independent of sentence meaning.
Experiment 2
What linguistic information is used to construct LF represen-
tations? When comprehenders adopted the universal-wide 
interpretation, they gave wide scope to the noun phrase at the 
start of the sentence. In doing this, they may have assigned 
wide scope to the first constituent of the sentence, wide 
scope to the subject, or wide scope to the agent, and then per-
severated in this assignment. Discriminating among these 
possibilities would indicate whether a linear representation, 
grammatical representation, or thematic representation involv-
ing meaning is constructed before LF during language com-
prehension. The linear representation appears compatible with 
the findings of Kurtzman and MacDonald (1993); their results 
suggest that comprehenders’ preferences make reference to 
linear order (e.g., the first quantified expression takes wide 
scope). The mapping of a grammatical relation to LF appears 
compatible with linguistic accounts (e.g., May, 1985), because 
it assumes that LF intervenes between a syntactic representa-
tion and meaning.
In Experiment 2, we attempted to distinguish among these 
accounts by using passive-voice prime sentences such as A 
tree was climbed by every kid and active-voice target sentences 
such as Every hiker climbed a hill. We hypothesized that if 
comprehenders assigned wide scope, for example, to the first 
quantified expression in the prime sentence (a tree), they 
should tend to assign wide scope to the first quantified expres-
sion in the target sentence (every hiker). Similarly, if they 
assign wide scope to the subject of the prime sentence (a tree), 
they should tend to assign wide scope to the subject of the 
target sentence (every hiker). In both of these cases, partici-
pants should be more likely to assign the universal-wide inter-
pretation to the target sentence in the existential-wide condition 
than in the universal-wide condition. But if they assign wide 
scope to the agent of the prime sentence (every kid), they 
should tend to assign wide scope to the agent of the target 
sentence (every hiker). They should then be more likely to 
assign the universal-wide interpretation to the target sentence 
in the universal-wide condition than in the existential-wide 
condition.
Method
Thirty-two different participants from the same population as 
in Experiment 1 were paid to participate. All experimental and 
filler pictures and target sentences were the same as in Experi-
ment 1. Prime sentences used in Experiment 1 were rewritten 
in the passive voice for Experiment 2 (e.g., A tree was climbed 
by every kid). Half of the filler sentences were written in the 
passive voice. The procedure, coding, and analysis were the 
same as in Experiment 1.
Table 1. Frequency of Universal-Wide and Existential-Wide 
Responses by Condition in Experiments 1 Through 4
       Target selected
Experiment and  
prime type Universal-wide Existential-wide
Experiment 1
 Universal-wide 262 (77%)  79 (23%)
 Existential-wide 244 (69%) 109 (31%)
Experiment 2
 Universal-wide 262 (74%)  91 (26%)
 Existential-wide 238 (67%) 116 (33%)
Experiment 3
 Universal-wide 525 (74%) 180 (26%)
 Existential-wide 536 (76%) 168 (24%)
Experiment 4
 Universal-wide 589 (84%) 112 (16%)
 Existential-wide 588 (85%) 106 (15%)
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Results and discussion
Table 1 summarizes participants’ selections, and Table 2 pres-
ents the results of the statistical analyses. Participants selected 
universal-wide target pictures significantly more often after 
selecting universal-wide prime pictures than after selecting 
existential-wide prime pictures (7%). These results support the 
thematic account, rather than the grammatical account or the 
linear account, and they suggest that comprehenders map a 
representation containing thematic information to LF. We also 
conducted a combined analysis of Experiments 1 and 2 to 
determine whether quantifier-scope priming differed between 
active-voice and passive-voice prime sentences (see Table 2). 
Although there was significant priming across both experi-
ments, priming did not differ between experiments. Thus, 
priming was unaffected by the relationship between gram-
matical relations and scope, or between word order and scope.
Experiment 3
The results of Experiment 2 may suggest that comprehenders 
have a simple tendency to repeat the scope assignment to par-
ticular thematic roles (the simple thematic-role account). For 
example, comprehenders may be more likely to assign wide 
scope to an agent if they have just assigned wide scope to 
another agent than if they have not. But in Experiment 2, the 
thematic roles were always quantified in the same way. In other 
words, agents were universally quantified, and patients were 
existentially quantified. Thus, it may be that comprehenders 
tended to repeat scope assignment to quantified thematic roles 
(the quantified thematic-role account). For example, compre-
henders were more likely to assign wide scope to a universally 
quantified agent if they had just assigned wide scope to another 
universally quantified agent than if they had not. But it is also 
possible that Experiment 2 (and indeed Experiment 1) showed 
priming of which quantified expression took wide scope, with-
out reference to any other aspect of the representation. Thus 
priming may simply have depended on the order of quantifiers 
(the quantifier-order account), with comprehenders being 
more likely to adopt a universal-wide interpretation for a sen-
tence if they had just adopted a universal-wide interpretation 
for another sentence than if they had not.
Experiment 3 was designed to distinguish among these 
possibilities. We used prime sentences such as A kid climbed 
every tree, with existentially quantified agents and universally 
quantified patients. Our target sentences were the same as in 
Experiments 1 and 2, with universally quantified agents and 
existentially quantified patients. The simple thematic-role 
Table 2. Logit Mixed-Model Analyses for Experiments 1 Through 4
Predictor   Coefficient   SE   Wald Z           p
Experiment 1: best-fitting model included prime type, χ2(1, N = 694) = 10.77, p < .001, log-likelihood = −312.9
Intercept 1.44 0.420 3.42 < .001
Prime type = universal-wide 0.72 0.214 3.34 < .001
Experiment 2: best-fitting model included prime type, χ2(1, N = 707) = 5.04, p < .05, log-likelihood = −384.9
Intercept 0.91 0.254 3.57 < .001
Prime type = universal-wide 0.42 0.183 2.30 < .05
Experiments 1 and 2: best-fitting model included prime type, χ2(1, N = 1,401) = 11.7, p < .001, log-likelihood = −749.1
Intercept 0.97 0.228 4.25 < .001
Prime type = universal-wide 0.45 0.130 3.46 < .001
Experiment 3: no improvement on null model
Experiments 1–2 vs. 3: best-fitting model included interaction between prime type  
and experiment, χ2(1, N = 2,810) = 8.07, p < .01, log-likelihood = −1,452
Intercept 0.95 0.211 4.51 < .001
Prime type = universal-wide 0.44 0.129 3.40 < .001
Experiment = Experiment 3 0.51 0.144 3.54 < .001
Interaction = universal-wide &  
Experiment 3
−0.54 0.188 −2.87 < .01
Experiment 4: no improvement on null model
Experiments 1–2 vs. 4: best-fitting model included interaction between prime type  
and experiment, χ2(1, N = 2,796) = 6.14, p < .05, log-likelihood = −1,301.3
Intercept 1.11 0.211 5.27 < .001
Prime type = universal-wide 0.44 0.129 3.40 < .001
Experiment = Experiment 4 1.03 0.157 6.54 < .001
Interaction = universal-wide &  
Experiment 4
−0.51 0.205 −2.50 < .05
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account predicts that participants should be more likely to 
select universal-wide target pictures after selecting existential-
wide prime pictures than after selecting universal-wide prime 
pictures. The quantified thematic-role account predicts that 
participants should be equally likely to select universal-wide 
target pictures after selecting existential-wide prime pictures or 
universal-wide prime pictures. The quantifier-order account 
predicts that participants should be more likely to select universal-
wide target pictures after selecting universal-wide prime pic-
tures than after selecting existential-wide prime pictures.
Method
Sixty-four different participants from the same population 
as in the previous experiments were paid to participate. The 
prime sentences were the same as the sentences in Experiment 
1, except that the quantifiers were switched. In the universal-
wide condition, each prime sentence was associated with the 
same pictures as in Experiment 1. In the existential-wide condi-
tion, each prime sentence was associated with new pictures con-
taining a single patient and three, four, or five agents (see Fig. 
1). Filler and target sentences and pictures were the same as in 
Experiment 1, as were the procedure, coding, and analysis.
Results and discussion
Table 1 summarizes participants’ selections. Results showed 
no evidence that participants’ choice of target picture was 
affected by the form of the prime sentence. To be confident 
that the manipulation in this experiment prevented priming, 
we compared Experiments 1 and 2 (64 participants), on the 
one hand, with Experiment 3 (64 participants), on the other 
hand (see Table 2). Priming was greater in Experiments 1 and 
2 (7%) than in Experiment 3 (–2%); this result confirmed that 
the priming effects in Experiments 1 and 2 were due to prime 
and target sentences containing expressions with the same the-
matic role and quantifier. These results are therefore incom-
patible with the simple thematic-role account and with the 
quantifier-order account. Instead, they suggest that compre-
henders tended to repeat scope assignment to quantified the-
matic roles. (The effect of experiment reported in Table 2 
presumably occurred because priming in Experiments 1 and 2 
occurred for the less-favored existential-wide interpretation.)
Another possible concern with Experiments 1 and 2 is that 
participants might simply have tended to choose visually simi-
lar pictures—for example, a target picture with a single patient 
(e.g., one hill) following a prime picture with a single patient 
(e.g., one tree). If so, the effects we observed would not be a 
result of the priming of quantifier-scope relations during sen-
tence comprehension. This explanation is rendered less likely 
by the results of Experiment 3, in which no priming occurred 
even though the matching prime picture in the universal-wide 
condition was the same as the universal-wide target picture. 
But to be more confident that this picture-priming explanation 
was not correct, we conducted Experiment 4, in which prime 
and target pictures were the same in both conditions, but the 
prime sentences were devoid of quantifiers.
Experiment 4
Method
Experiment 4 involved 64 different participants and used 
prime sentences containing bare plural noun phrases with 
generic interpretations. To bring about the generic interpreta-
tion, we constructed half of the prime sentences so that they 
involved additional verbs (e.g., like in Kids like to climb trees), 
and half so that they involved adverbs (e.g., often in Sailors 
often spot airplanes). All experimental and filler pictures and 
target sentences were the same as in Experiment 1, as were the 
procedure, coding, and analysis.
Results and discussion
Table 1 summarizes participants’ selections. Priming did not 
occur when the prime sentences were devoid of quantifiers. 
Thus, the priming effects in Experiments 1 and 2 were due to 
comprehension of doubly quantified sentences and not to 
visual similarity between prime and target pictures. To be 
more certain that the prime sentences caused the priming in 
Experiments 1 and 2, we compared Experiments 1 and 2 (64 
participants), on the one hand, with Experiment 4 (64 partici-
pants), on the other hand (see Table 2). Priming was greater in 
Experiments 1 and 2 (7%) than in Experiment 4 (–1%); this 
result confirmed that the quantified sentences in Experiments 
1 and 2 led to priming that did not occur with the generic sen-
tences in Experiment 4.
Participants were more likely to select a universal-wide tar-
get picture following a generic prime sentence (84%; Experi-
ment 4) than following a quantified prime sentence (72%; 
mean of Experiments 1 and 2). A likely explanation is that 
participants tended to interpret the generic sentences in Exper-
iment 4 as having an LF similar to the LF of the universal-
wide interpretations of the prime sentences in Experiments 1 
and 2 (but that participants accepted that the existential-wide 
prime picture was compatible with these generic sentences). 
Supporting this explanation, an analysis that divided the 
experiment into fourths found fewer universal-wide interpre-
tations of the target picture in the first fourth (78%) than in the 
other fourths (84%, 87%, and 86%). The generic prime sen-
tences may therefore have led to long-term priming of the 
universal-wide interpretation of the target pictures. There were 
no similar trends in Experiments 1 through 3.
General Discussion
The four experiments we conducted showed that participants 
tended to perseverate in their interpretation of doubly quanti-
fied sentences. In all experiments, participants had to choose 
whether sentences such as Every hiker climbed a hill should be 
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assigned a universal-wide interpretation (in which the hikers 
climbed potentially different hills) or an existential-wide inter-
pretation (in which the hikers climbed the same hill). Experi-
ment 1 found that participants’ choice was affected by their 
interpretation of active-voice prime sentences, such as Every 
kid climbed a tree. Experiment 2 used passive-voice prime 
sentences, such as A tree was climbed by every kid, and found 
effects equivalent to those in Experiment 1. Experiment 3 used 
prime sentences, such as A kid climbed every tree, that con-
tained existentially quantified agents and universally quanti-
fied patients, and found no priming. Experiment 4 used generic 
prime sentences, such as Kids like to climb trees, and did not 
find priming, thereby ruling out a visual-priming explanation 
of the results.
Experiments 1 and 2 therefore provide evidence that com-
prehenders construct disambiguated abstract representations 
that specify quantifier-scope relations. Because prime and tar-
get sentences referred to different entities in these experi-
ments, comprehenders must have computed a representation 
that was independent of the final meaning of the sentence, 
as might be captured by a situation model (e.g., Zwaan & 
Radvansky, 1998). Priming could not have been a result of 
repetition of the situation model described by the prime sen-
tence because the prime and target sentences referred to differ-
ent entities.
Another possibility is that comprehenders might have primed 
formal characteristics of a situation model (i.e., abstracting over 
the entities) so that different entities could be linked by analogy. 
Such an account would treat the situation model for the univer-
sal-wide interpretation of A kid climbed every tree (see the left-
most prime picture for Experiment 3 in Fig. 1a) as equivalent to 
the situation model for the universal-wide interpretation of 
Every kid climbed a tree (see the left-hand target picture in Fig. 
1b). However, no priming occurred between these interpreta-
tions in Experiment 3. Instead, the priming effects we observed 
appear to reflect the construction of an LF representation.
Taken together, Experiments 2 and 3 support the quantified 
thematic-role account, according to which comprehenders per-
severate in their assignment of scope to quantified thematic 
roles. Experiment 2 found priming and suggested that the 
assignment of scope did not adhere to grammatical relations 
(e.g., the subject takes wide scope) or linear order (e.g., the first 
quantified expression takes wide scope), but rather involved 
thematic roles. Experiment 3 did not find priming and therefore 
we ruled out an alternative explanation according to which 
priming was due to the preservation of quantifier order. At the 
same time, Experiment 3 demonstrated that thematic roles only 
affected scope relations in conjunction with quantifier repeti-
tion (e.g., a universally quantified agent takes wide scope). 
This suggests that LF is affected by aspects of meaning. How 
can LF be affected by meaning and yet independent of it?
We propose that people comprehend sentences by access-
ing the meanings of the words in a sentence and incrementally 
building up a syntactic representation that determines which 
noun phrases serve as which arguments of the verb. In Every 
hiker climbed a hill, this representation would capture that 
every hiker is the subject of climbed and that a hill is the object 
of climbed. In addition, comprehenders determine that a hiker 
or hikers is the agent of climbed and that a hill or hills is the 
patient of climbed, and that hiker is universally quantified and 
that hill is existentially quantified. This means that compre-
henders have determined the quantificational information that 
will allow them to compute scope relations (but have not fixed 
the number of hikers or hills). At this point, they know some-
thing about the meaning of the sentence but have not chosen a 
disambiguated interpretation. Then they can construct a dis-
ambiguated LF representation that has been informed by the 
aspects of meaning encoded in thematic roles.
Finally, comprehenders interpret the LF with respect to the 
world (which in our experiments corresponded to a picture). In 
other words, quantifier-scope relations are computed over an 
interpreted representation that includes thematic information 
(e.g., Parsons, 1991). However, the construction of LF may 
also proceed incrementally, as long as it lags behind assign-
ment of thematic roles and quantifiers to arguments. For 
example, comprehenders may assign the agent role to every 
hiker after encountering climbed, then construct a partial LF 
representation that includes the universally quantified expres-
sion every hiker, then assign the patient role to a hill, and 
finally construct a complete LF representation.
This account does not fit with linguistic explanations 
in which LF sits between syntactic representation and final 
interpretation (e.g., May, 1985). However, this account is 
compatible with the intuition that it is possible to understand 
something about complex quantified sentences without resolv-
ing all the quantifiers—the comprehender assigns thematic 
roles but stops at this point. Our findings demonstrate that 
people construct LF representations during comprehension 
and that such representations, like representations of syntax, 
are able to persist and affect subsequent processing.
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